Although my last post, “The Worldviewer in the World,” was quite long, I left much out of it that I could have included. Typically these blog posts are explorations, and like the RPG gamer, I find so many side-quests that might potentially lead me off the track of the main quest; or, like Montaigne, I can become quite as interested in so many related considerations that I can begin to focus on them to the detriment of my main topic. Indeed, for me the main topic seems to be all the above, since any relevant topics may seem, well, not irrelevant.
Here I will frame some broader considerations into the form of a response to Sean Meade.
Responding to Sean Meade
Sean Meade, who inspired that previous blog post by asking a simple question on Facebook, has responded with a stream-of-consciousness comment that Typepad would not allow for some reason by posting that comment at his blog, interact. Generally agreeing on the issue of the existence of problems relating to subjectivity and naïve realism, he nonetheless raises a question regarding the “G” portions of my previous blog post:
Second, the attempt to avoid the recursive tautological dilemma of naïve realism invariably leads to a presumption of the existence of an extra-real, because outside the objective reality, first cause or prime mover; i.e., to avoid U=U and its tautological insufficiency vis-à-vis meaning and value, a meaningful G in some form is imagined to exist outside “the rest” of objective reality that will give meaning to the World. These in conjunction will lead to a philosophical idealism in practice, or to philosophical subjectivity misconstrued as objectivity, or else to philosophical relativism — i.e., ultimately to nihilism, since meaning and value, rather than existing inherently in objective reality, will be found in extra-real or imaginary realities, subjective meanings, imagined relationships, and so forth, and these may begin to appear arbitrary. [WEEKS]
hmm. do i agree? i happen to believe in an extra-real, but is that necessarily my guarantee of any objective world? i believe there is an objective world (realism metaphysic) but am skeptical (epistemology) about our ability to know it (in the justified true belief sense). therefore, am in on the hook for your criticism here? they don't seem to apply to me, though maybe it is arbitrary (unprovable, philosophically) in the end. i'd be ok with that ;-) [MEADE]
I have already responded to this via Facebook; but I will summarize and expand those comments here.
First, the references to “G” were intended to be within the context of a consideration of nihilism/teleology (which was ongoing before and after that select quote) rather than realism in general or objectivism. So rather than a “guarantee of any objective world” — which I take to be, guarantee of the existence of an objective world — I meant for “G” to reference a guarantee of inherent meaning or value in the so-called objective world. Besides “G” (in that characterization of a particular teleology), “I'” as an individual human observer and “U” as Universe/World combine to give a framework permitting particular teleological assessments of reality in general, or the meaningfulness of objective reality, rather than necessarily justifying or proving that the objective world exists.
Second, one great omission from my original blog post may create a lack of clarity for the above: that, generally speaking, “G” can be any sort of extra-real explanation giving meaning to what otherwise may seem meaningless, chaotic, arbitrary. So, although I used “G” because that is the first letter of “God,” and I referenced ideas relating to a First Cause or Prime Mover, “G” could stand for any universalist, perhaps even uniformist, conception of force or theory used in conjunction with “I” and “U” for creating meaning for an observer. Pantheism, Manichaeism, various so-called superstitions, any philosophical Scheme or framework, etc., could be included under “G.” This might include particular schools of philosophy and even particular (often, polemical) explanations given by those studying science, a la some grand unification theory or unifying explanation — and, typically these will be used dogmatically, if for no other reason than that “G” forms a necessary leg in a person’s Worldview.
Third, the section cited by Sean Meade, and in fact most of the blog post, was intended to remain within a consideration of naïve realism. So, naïve realists will often default to a “triune unity” teleology — and, the particular triune unity teleology described in my blog post — but this is not to say that no other form of a triune approach exists or that all conceptualizations, understandings, uses, and so forth of “G” will be identical to the naïve realist’s, nor have the same constraints and be subject to the same foibles we would see in the naïve realist’s teleology. True, this #3 may be an “out”, but also true, I had no specific focus in mind when writing on the subject of “G” beyond an exploration of the naïve realist’s teleology — although, again true, it might seem to others, as it seems to me, that naïve realism may be the most common form of interaction with the world, or interactive approach, in the history of humanity.
Fourth, it seems to me — and this might be apparent in that long blog post, or perhaps ought to be apparent — that, for naïve realists, ontology and teleology, epistemology, and so forth, are all one. I.e., a naïve realist tends not to separate belief in an objective world, perceptions of that objective world, and so forth from the teleology which gives meaning to that objective world and to the perceptions naïve realists have of that world. Here, I wonder if Sean Meade’s reading of the above passage might have similarly blurred the distinction between a “guarantee of [the existence of] any objective world” and a guarantee of meanings, and meaningfulness, beyond the mere physical qualities and attributes of that objective world. Of course, here I am also questioning whether the two will ever be separate for anyone, on any sort of absolute basis, and whether we are helped or hurt by considering the possibility of clear demarcations between belief in the existence of an objective world and higher-order beliefs about that world
Fifth, a problem that might arise for any reader of my previous blog post: Where I am writing from my own viewpoint, polemical or merely biased, adding my own opinions, or am addressing Nietzsche’s apparent method, arguments, and so forth, may not always be clear. In general, I was working toward an exploration of and explanation of Nietzsche’s stance, and in many respects I am sympathetic with Nietzsche. It may be possible to see in Nietzsche a very broad and general mode of attack when viewing his polemics, and to stretch our imaginations to consider the likelihood that Nietzsche’s broad criticisms of society-in-general, religion-in-general, and so forth are his responses to the prevalence, then current and historical, of naïve realism rather than the attempt to design a particular dogmatism or create a particular school of his own. This in fact may trip up some commentators on Nietzsche, either naïve realists in all but name themselves or pedantic specialists in philosophy who seek clear definition of Nietzsche within the polemical “schools” of philosophy and find only generality. For my own part, I am, broadly speaking, a Pyrrhonian skeptic: I find value, such as it is and such as I find it for myself, in the search itself, without coming to firm conclusions about particulars or even about universalist schemes – although part of that process involves a fairly latent and strong suspicion that universalist schemes, as Nietzsche might say, are so far quite inadequate. At this point, a diversion into an exegesis of my own particular relationships to “G” may involve more pixels, and words, than would be prudent for this blog post; so, let’s leave it at Nietzsche for now.
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